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Abstract: The acute brain slicing method has become one of the foundations of modern neuroscience research. It is a 
laboratory technique in electrophysiology, which allows the study of electrical properties directly on a freshly prepared 
slice of animal brain tissue. During recording and/or stimulation, the acutely isolated brain slice is artificially kept “alive” 
up to many hours after the animals’ death. During an acute brain slice preparation, cortical and subcortical areas, which 
are suggested to correlate with conscious experience in humans, such as the claustrum and the thalamus, are 
dissected. In this paper, we investigate whether scientific statements can be made regarding the likelihood that some 
neural activities on the brain slice still support consciousness or degrees thereof. 
We exemplarily demonstrate how acute slices are produced and provide own electrophysiological data combined with a 
short literature review. Subsequently, we introduce the concept of Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) and apply 
conditional probabilities inferred from Bayes´ theorem, in order to draw from it an informed hypothesis on the likelihood 
that specific neural activities that sustain on the slice still correlate with some form of conscious experience. We propose 
that the probability that there is something that is it like to be, even on the acutely isolated brain slice, is similar to the 
likelihood that certain mental states correlate with certain brain activities in a healthy human subject, depending on the 
robustness of the underlying NCC. 
Keywords: Neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), Acute slice electrophysiology, Philosophy, Empirical bayes 
methods, Conditional probability. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
What happens to your inner subjective experience, 
your conscious state that you are in at that very 
moment, when suddenly an ice-cold vibrating razor 
blade dissects exactly those brain regions suggested to 
be the neural correlate of your specific conscious 
state? Does the razor blade only cut your (mostly still) 
living brain tissue apart or is it also cutting away 
content of your conscious experience slice-by-slice? 
What if this dissection were so gentle that 300 µm thick 
brain sections could be produced, where many cells 
inside this acutely isolated brain slice still show intact 
membrane properties and neuronal network 
participation? What would happen to your conscious 
experience in such a situation? Would your 
consciousness fade away gradually, slice after slice? 
Or would this preparation directly and immediately lead  
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to an irreversible loss of all your conscious states at 
once, after the first cut? In other words: Is 
consciousness dissectible?  
At first glance, this question seems to be rather 
vague and based on too speculative premises in order 
to be answered directly, but it bears a degree of 
intuitive plausibility that renders it worth investigating. 
Hundreds of well-trained electrophysiologists use the 
acute slicing method to deepen our understanding of 
brain physiology on a daily basis [1-5] whilst the 
underlying basic question of what happens to an 
individuals’ conscious states and contents is still 
unanswered. Recently, a method was capable to 
extend the lifespan of an acutely produced murine 
brain slice to more than 36 hours following preparation 
[3], which lends further relevance to the issue of 
whether any scientific statements can be made 
regarding the likelihood that some form of conscious 
experience might preserve on so produced brain slices. 
In this paper, we discuss, based on empirical 
findings, how much cellular activity is expected to 
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persist on the acutely isolated brain slice and, as more 
speculative but empirically informed extrapolations, 
what the likelihood may be that these cellular activities 
still correlate with some form of conscious experience. 
We address the first issue of this work - how much 
activity persists on the isolated brain – in section 2. 
Here we exemplarily show how acute slices are 
produced and provide own electrophysiological data 
combined with a short literature review for these 
illustrations. In section 3, we introduce the concept of 
neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) from Koch 
and Crick [6] and survey whether any NCC-candidate 
might preserve their biological function after the acute 
brain slice preparation. To speculate on the likelihood 
that specific neural activities that sustain on the slice 
still correlate with some form of conscious experience, 
we apply conditional probabilities inferred from Bayes´ 
theorem; based on the work of Bernroider [7], Bialek [8] 
and Choe [9]. We close with a critical valuation of the 
NCC-approach in general and state that given our 
formal representation the likelihood that there is 
something that is it like to be, even on the acutely 
isolated brain slice, is similar to the likelihood that 
certain mental states correlate with certain brain 
activities in a healthy human subject – depending on 
the robustness of the underlying NCC.* 
2. ACUTE SLICE ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY  
Based on the pioneering work of Henry McIlwain 
[10-12], the acute brain slice preparation has become 
one of the most commonly used methods in 
neurophysiology [13, 14]. During an acute rat or mouse 
brain slice preparation (see Figure 1), following 
anesthesia, (A) the brain (white arrow) is removed from 
the skull, (B) sliced on a vibratome, (C) and finally 
transferred to a recording device. There are various 
protocols available to produce viable acute brain slices 
[4, 15] for several cell types and brain regions (D) 
predominantly for mice and rats, like the cerebellum 
[16], the hippocampus [17], the piriform cortex [18], the 
barrel cortex[19], the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
[20], the thalamus [21], the hypothalamus [22], the 
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corpus callosum and the motor cortex [23], the 
olfactory bulb [24], the brainstem [25], different 
dopaminergic neurons of the midbrain [26-28], the 
amygdala [29], and parts of the basal ganglia [30], such 
as the substantia nigra [31]. Notably, a new recovery 
incubation system was capable to extend the lifespan 
of an acutely produced brain slice to more than 36 
hours following preparation [3]. This leads to the 
question of how much cellular activity is reported to 
persist on so produced acutely isolated brain slice. 
As exemplarily demonstrated in Figure 2, many 
different types of brain cells are still intact after the 
acute slice preparation. For example, our whole-cell 
recordings visualized in Figure 2 on the acute mouse 
brain slice of principal neurons in the cerebral cortex 
and the hippocampus are confirmed by single cell 
measurements carried out in anesthetized (alive) mice 
in-vivo (e.g. [32]). Moreover, our recordings of 
immature neurons parallel in-vitro recordings of 
cultured immature neurons (e.g. [33]). Even 
oligodendroglial progenitor cells, studied on the brain 
slice, mirror the functional properties of oligodendroglial 
progenitor cells recorded in-vivo (e.g. [23, 34]). Taken 
together, cell-specific properties and activities are 
sustained on the slice, at least to the time-point of 
measurement. 
A substantial body of electrophysiological research 
affirms the viability of the acute slice method to study 
not only single cells, but also physiological 
characteristics down to the level of synapses (e.g. [35-
38]), or up to the level of neural networks. One of the 
most prominent network properties are long-term 
potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression (LTD). 
LTP and LTD are suggested to build the cellular basis 
of learning [39-42]. Both have been described and 
studied on acute brain slices of the hippocampus (eg. 
[41]), the neocortex [43, 44], the amygdale [45], 
different mid-brain areas [46], the cerebellum [47, 48], 
and the striatum [49]. The ability of a cellular 
microcircuit to learn and memorize specific stimulations 
(e.g., LTP or LTD) determines that a sufficient amount 
of synapses and cells within this cellular circuit must be 
functioning properly and keep specific spike trains 
structured to still encode for specific information, 
following the acute slice preparation.  
But is the remaining array of brain activity on the 
slice sufficient to correlate with conscious experience? 
Is there a something that is it like to be inside of a fresh 
slice of brain tissue? In every slice? What is already 
known about the function of the brain regions that the 
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acute slice preparation is dissecting? In the following 
section, we will approach this question with the help of 
the so-called Neural Correlates of Consciousness. 
 
Figure 1: Acute slice preparation visualization. (A) The rodent brain (white arrow) is removed from the scull and (B) sliced by 
the use of a vibratom. (C) So produced brain slices are transferred to a measurement device (e.g. an upright microscope for 
single-cell patch clamp experiments). (D) Vital brain slices of rodents can be produced of many brain region of interest, like the 
claustrum or other brain regions suggested to correlate with conscious experience in humans (red areas). 
 
 
Figure 2: Single cell whole cell patch-clamp recordings performed on acutely isolated brain tissue as a method to 
characterize various cell types or to identify specific maturation stages. (a) On the slice, mature neurons, like the 
pyramidal cells of the cerebral cortex or dentate gyrus granular cells of the hippocampus, elicit strong sodium (INa) driven inward 
currents (upper recording) and action potential firing rates (lower recording) can be increased by the induction of current steps 
(e.g. nine 40 pA current steps, 50ms). (b) Doublecortin (DCX) expressing immature neurons as well as their maturation stages 
on their way to functional integration can be traced (IK = potassium current). (c) Glial cells, like NG2-expressing oligodendroglial 
progenitor cells or polydendrocytes, can be functionally identified by the absence of action potential firing, their low membrane 
resistance, and potassium driven outward currents (IK) with a strong inactivation over time. Scale bars: 50 µm. 
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3. NEURAL CORRELATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS  
A neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) is 
defined as the “minimum neural mechanism sufficient 
for any one specific conscious percept” [6]. This 
definition presumes that there is something that it is like 
to be and this something is then termed 
´consciousness´, without further details or sub-
definitions. While this “what is it like-ness” seems not 
be reducible to physical processes, the inner subjective 
states of an organism might directly correlate with the 
activity of specific brain regions or functions [6, 50-52]. 
Thus, NCC are an elegant way to enable investigations 
of various brain regions and functions – the neural 
correlates (NC) – directly, while the last ‘C’, the 
conscious experience, is studied only indirectly as a 
mere correlation. While this simple working definition is 
not without some conceptual problems [53, 54] the use 
of the NCC approach has led to noteworthy 
advantages in the neuroscience of consciousness in 
the last number of decades. 
The neurobiological quest for consciousness has 
led to some promising NCC candidates. Nowadays, the 
neuroscientific community differentiates between the 
general/full NCC, a content-specific NCC and the 
background conditions that must be fulfilled for being 
conscious at all. A general NCC is defined as the full 
NCC including all neural substrates enabling conscious 
experiences in their entirety, regardless their specific 
contents. A content-specific NCC is the brain regions or 
functions, which determines a particular conscious 
experience. These differentiations led to a variety of 
promising candidate brain regions to correlate with 
conscious experiences in humans, as outlined in  
Figure 3. It must be noted, however, that no single area 
or activity has yet been conclusively identified to 
correlate with conscious experience, neither in humans 
nor in non-human animals (reviewed in [51]). 
4. NCC-CANDIDATES 
Lesions of the cerebellum were shown to have no 
effect on conscious experiences in human patients  
[56, 57], which excludes the cerebellum as a NCC in 
general, a content-specific NCC as well as a 
background condition of a NCC. More relevant for the 
search of NCC, lesions in the brainstem were reported 
to cause immediate coma [58] by damaging the 
reticular activating system [59] in humans. However, 
brainstem activity alone is insufficient to sustain 
consciousness in a clinical sense, since human 
patients with substantial damages in their frontal 
cortices but intact brainstem function were often 
reported to be in a vegetative state [58]. Thus, it was 
suggested that the brainstem might be a necessary 
background condition for conscious experience [51], 
but neither a content specific NCC, nor a full NCC.  
Some basal ganglia nuclei are likely NCC-
candidates. These nuclei are strongly interconnected 
with the cerebral cortex, thalamus, and brainstem. 
Interestingly, the basal ganglia are commonly reported 
to play a central role in cognition [51] and lesions in the 
basal ganglia were documented to lead to an 
emotionless state [60, 61] in humans. This suggests 
the basal ganglia to play an important role for 
conscious experience. However, one report from a 
human being with bilateral basal ganglia hemorrhagic 
lesions found no significant alternation in the level of 
consciousness [62]. Thus, it remains unclear whether 
the basal ganglia contribute to consciousness in 
 
Figure 3: Plausible anatomical structures previously suggested to correlate with conscious experience [55], 
approximated on a schematic mouse brain (sagittal). It should be noted that the various NNC candidates are primarily 
deduced from human studies. Different brain regions are only shown schematically in this illustration; their location is 
approximated and many cannot be found on the same sagittal plane, neither in humans, nor in mice. 
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general or if the basal ganglia functions are necessary 
for specific conscious contents. 
Another prominent NCC candidate is the claustrum, 
which is a thin, irregular sheet of neurons closely 
attached to the neocortex, considered by some 
researchers to be part of the basal ganglia [63]. The 
claustrum is bidirectionally connected with most cortical 
regions [64]. Thus, it was hypothesized by many that 
the claustrum plays a crucial role for information 
integration [65-67] and is, therefore, necessary for 
conscious experience in general [50]. Further 
highlighting the role of the claustrum to support con- 
sciousness in general, the direct electrical stimulation 
of the claustrum in one human study disrupted 
consciousness reversibly [68]. Accordingly, the function 
of the claustrum is often believed to be the NCC in 
general.  
Beside the claustrum, one of the most prominent 
and controversial structures supposed to correlate with 
conscious experience are the various thalamic regions. 
Many experts propose that at least some thalamic cell 
clusters represent critical enabling factors for 
consciousness in general [69-72]. Nevertheless, other 
studies were unable to confirm a central role of the 
thalamus for conscious experience, in non-human 
animal lesion experiments [73-75], in brain injured 
human patients [76], as well as in human patients in a 
vegetative state [77, 78]. Accordingly, the role of the 
thalamus for conscious experience remains elusive.  
Based on the still existing uncertainties of other 
NCC postulates, a further NCC “hot zone” was 
proposed recently: the posterior-medial cortex [51]. 
Compared to other NCC candidates, this highly 
interconnected cortical region showed the strongest 
correlation between decreases in brain activity and loss 
of consciousness in recent human brain imaging 
studies [77, 79]. Further studies are necessary to 
illuminate the possible correlation between the 
posterior-medial cortex activity and conscious 
experience in humans and non-human animals.  
Taken together, there are some likely candidates of 
brain structures which activities are expected to 
correlate, in one way or another, with consciousness in 
humans. On some of these brain structures 
electrophysiological measurements on acutely isolated 
brain slices were already carried out in non-human 
animals [20, 26-28, 30, 49]. By a combination of both, 
the NCC-approach and current knowledge regarding 
the biology of acute sliced brain tissue, we further 
discuss in the following section what can be expected 
to happen to consciousness and its (presumptive) 
neural correlate by the use of Bayes´ probability 
theorem.  
5. BAYES´ THEOREMS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF 
NCCS ON SLICES 
The usual NCC-research approach begins with a 
subject of any kind, as simplified in Figure 4a. Let us 
assume this subject to be an awake human adult 
without any pathology or other peculiarities. There is 
good reason to assume that this subject bears some 
conscious states of any form, denoted as   A . Most such 
awake “standard subjects” are able to communicate 
their conscious states, which is strengthening the 
assumption that some form of A  is given in the subject 
under investigation as well. The task, then, is to identify 
and characterize a measurable physical signal  B given  
A . Mathematically spoken, the aim of scientific 
consciousness research might be described by a 
function f, such as 
f : A! B.   
While # is assumed to be a highly complex function, an 
NCC researcher simply postulates that there is a 
correlation between A  and B , without further stating 
what the correlation actually is; and whenever A ,   B    is 
present and B  can be characterized scientifically. With 
this simple but effective approach, neuroscientists were 
able to come up with the remarkable list of NCC-
candidates reviewed in the previous section.  
For an acute brain slice, there are not as many 
reasons to assume that any forms of conscious 
experience or degrees thereof, as was the case for the 
awake human adult. Moreover, we cannot expect any 
form of verbal or non-verbal report about an inner 
mental state from a brain slice. To define the likelihood 
that conscious experience is present on the slice 
(Figure 4b) we must rely on the measurable physical 
signals only and compare them to the physical signals 
obtained using the standard NCC-mode described in 
Figure 4a. This indicates that the reliability of predicting 
A  given just B    for non-responding entities depends 
exclusively on the robustness of the prior defined NCC 
B    given A ). To avoid a circular argument, such as 
A! B( )! B! A( ) , we here suggest the use of 
probability statements.  
More precisely, we want to estimate the probability 
of an event A  occurring, when it is known that an event 
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B  has occurred. This probability is called a conditional 
probability [7, 80, 81] and is denoted by  
P A / B( ) . 
In our case, this term can be read as “the probability 
P   that a specific conscious state A is occurring, given 
that a particular physical signal B    has already 
occurred”. This conditional probability can, in principle, 
be calculated using Bayes´ theorem, which can be 
expressed by the following equation [8, 9]:  
 P A / B( ) = P B / A( )P A( )P B( ) . 
Now imagine a hypothetical experiment on one 
human subject. Let there be 100 trials so that N =100.  
Say that in half of these trials, the imaginary subject is 
conscious, while in the other 50 trials, the tested 
person is unconscious. Let us also assume that a 
particular physical signal B   has already occurred in 40 
of the 50 trials, in which the imaginary subject was 
conscious. Let us further assume that B also occurred 
in 10 trials, in which the subject was unconscious, 
since there still is – as reviewed in the previous section 
- no neural correlate perfectly correlating with consci- 
ousness. These hypothetical assumptions might be 
denoted and estimated by 
P A / B( ) = P B / A( )P A( )P B( ) =
P A! B( )
P B( ) =
40
50 "0.5
0.5 =
4
5  
so that if B  is a predefined NCC-candidate and   A  a 
certain conscious state: P A / B( ) > P A( ) . 
With this, we can conclude, based upon nothing but 
the intuitively plausible assumptions made above, that 
the estimated conditional probability that conscious 
states occur on the slice, given that specific physical 
signals occur, is not zero. As a consequence, if an 
(almost) ideal NCC could be identified, there is a 
formally valid motivation and justification to use “just” 
the presence of a neural correlate (NC) to predict the 
occurrence of a conscious state (C), without the need 
of actual reportability. Thus, it might be that for every 
entity an (almost) ideal NCC might bear some 
predictive power to predict the presence of certain 
mental states, given certain physical signals; even for 
entities like humans in unclassified comas or non-
 
Figure 4: Simplified flowcharts of the basic principles of the NCC-approach. (a) Imaging a subject (e.g. an awake human 
being) is asked about its mental state. If there is good reason to assume the presence of some certain forms of consciousness 
(A), then certain physical signals (B) might be identified and attributed to correlate with A. This defines B as a possible NCC. (b) 
If the entity of investigation is unable to report about its inner mental states (e.g. an acute brain slice), the source for scientific 
statements about possible conscious states (A*) have to be grounded on certain physical signals (B*). (c) The slice-problem 
highlights the problem of reportability in NCC-research. While a system that can report about its inner mental state helps to 
identify any correlations (r²) between the physical signals and the conscious states, systems that are unable to report about 
conscious sates (e.g. brain slices, humans in vegetative states, non-human beings of certain physical complexities etc.) are 
conceptually problematic. 
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human animals. While this intuition is shared by many 
neuroscientists, it is now more than a mere intuition. It 
is a plausible and formally sound prediction, based on 
elementary probability theory. 
6. DISCUSSION 
We applied conditional probabilities inferred from 
Bayes´ theorem to speculate on the likelihood that 
specific neural activities sustained on an acutely 
isolated brain slice correlate with some form of 
conscious experience. Our formal analysis shows that 
there is a convincing way to predict conscious states 
from predefined NCC, even for beings unable to report 
about their inner mental states. Thus, our application 
can be seen as a potential extension of the NCC-
approach. The formal analysis can further be used to 
highlight and treat certain conceptual obstacles for the 
practicability of NCC in general.  
Reportability is a crucial necessity to identify any 
potential neural correlate. If a report about an inner 
mental state can be correlated with certain physical 
activity, repetition and an increase of the sample size 
(e.g., include more human participants) may help to 
correlate, indirectly, this physical activity with the 
(reported) mental state, as schematically illustrated in 
Figure 4c. One minor but noteworthy problem of the 
NCC approach is that the study design must ensure 
that neural correlate reports are not mistaken for NCC. 
A prominent suggested solution to this problem is to 
determine the neural correlates of stimulus reportability 
without any prior assumptions about its relationship to 
consciousness [82] first, before proceeding with the 
actual NCC studies proper. Nevertheless, subjects who 
are unable to communicate about their mental states 
constitute a serious conceptual problem (Figure 4c).  
As stated above, the claustrum is believed to be 
one of the most likely brain regions to support 
conscious experience in humans. Can we state 
whether an acutely isolated brain slice of a mouse 
containing claustral tissue bears some form of 
consciousness? Based upon its connectome across 
various mammals and its activity, the claustrum has 
been proposed as one of the cornerstones of sensory 
integration [65, 83, 84]. Accordingly, the claustrum 
entails extensive large-scale neuronal projections to 
cortical and subcortical regions [67, 84-87]. Roughly 
85% of all claustral neurons are long-range projection 
neurons in humans with their pyramidal somata evenly 
distributed throughout the body of the claustrum [88, 
89]. These excitatory neurons have spiny dendrites 
with axons projecting out of the claustrum and have cell 
body diameters of 15–29 µm. Depending on the angle 
and plane of the produced brain slice, most of their 
long-range axons are destroyed during acute brain 
slicing. It is unknown whether the relatively small 
somata of these pyramidal cells in a 300 µm thick brain 
slice die instantly or stay functional – and if they do 
stay functional, for how long (several seconds, several 
tens of seconds, or several minutes). However, about 
15% of claustral cells have cell body diameters of 10–
15 µm, are aspiny, and have axons that do not project 
outside the body of the claustrum, as evidenced by 
human and cat studies [88, 90]. Many of these aspiny 
neurons most likely stay functional following the 
preparation. Still, the remaining functionality of the 
claustrum might not fulfill the assumption that a 
physical signal correlating with conscious states in an 
alive organism B  is sufficiently similar to the measura- 
ble physical signals B!  on the acute slice. To answer 
the question whether consciousness is, at least to 
some degree present on such a claustral slice, it must 
be empirically shown that at least some . As 
soon as there is sufficient empirical data fulfilling this 
criterion, a conditional probability can be calculated in 
principle.  
One general objection to our considerations might 
be that consciousness, with all its richness, is a purely 
human phenomenon. While our present work is mainly 
focused on the formal structure of a possible statement 
regarding consciousness in non-responsive beings, 
rather than giving a concrete answer regarding 
consciousness on (e.g.,) a murine brain slice, we 
consider it an objection that is to be taken seriously. If 
we were postulate the above claim as true, then a 
rodent might not, or not to a sufficient extent, share the 
quality of human conscious experience. Therefore, a 
projection of a human consciousness into an acutely 
sliced rodent brain would be misleading. In answer to 
this objection, we emphasize that the neural substrates 
of e.g., emotions do not appear to be confined to 
cortical structures and that, as the Cambridge 
Declaration on Consciousness postulates it, “humans 
are not unique in possessing the neurological substrat- 
es that generate consciousness” [91]. In addition, as 
visualized in Figure 3 most prominent NCC candidates 
are subcortical brain regions present in both, humans 
and rodents. Accordingly, in our opinion, there is 
“compelling evidence for evolutionarily shared primal 
affective qualia” between mice and man. While the 
richness and resolution of a visual percept of humans 
might outperform the spectrum of a mouse’s visual 
experience, the primal “what it is like-ness” might be 
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similar. Moreover, the richness and resolution of an 
odor percept of a mouse might outshine the human 
capacity to discriminate different aromas. Nevertheless, 
the “what is it like to smell something” is presumably 
comparatively similar. Therefore, we assume that while 
the richness of percepts might differ between mice and 
man, the inner subjective experience for “what is it like 
to have the brain sliced acutely” is a matter of degree 
and not of category. Moreover, the concept of degrees 
of consciousness accounts, in our opinion, also to 
humans with reduced, or not yet developed, cognitive 
capacities, like humans suffering on neurodegenerative 
diseases, split-brain patients, or even infants.  
7. OUTLOOK 
While NCC is a potent tool of today’s neuroscience 
of consciousness we highly encourage to further 
investigate the causal relation between the mind and its 
body. We highly encourage philosophy and neuro- 
science to merge together even more tightly in the near 
future, so that one day we may use neural causation of 
consciousness instead of neural correlates of 
consciousness. 
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